IV. Fourthly, the Definition precisely determines the acts of the Pontiff to which this Divine assistance is attached; namely, 'in doctrina de fide vel moribus definienda' to the defining of doctrine of faith and morals.

The definition, therefore, carefully excludes all ordinary and common acts of the Pontiff as a private person, and also all acts of the Pontiff as a private theologian, and again all his acts which are not in matters of faith and morals; and further, all acts in which he does not define a doctrine, that is, in which he does not act as the supreme Doctor of the Church in defining doctrines to be held by the whole Church.

The definition therefore includes, and includes only, the solemn acts of the Pontiff as the supreme Doctor of all Christians, defining doctrines of faith and morals, to be held by the whole Church.

Now the word doctrine here signifies a revealed truth, traditionally handed down by the teaching authority, or magisterium infallibile, of the Church; including any truth which, though not revealed, is yet so united with a revealed truth as to be inseparable from its full explanation, and defence.

And the word definition here signifies the precise judgment or sentence in which any such traditional truth of faith or morals may be authoritatively formulated; as, for instance, the consubstantiality of the Son, the procession of the Holy Ghost by one only Spiration from the Father and the Son, the Immaculate Conception, and the like.

The word 'definition' has two senses, the one forensic and narrow, the other wide and common; and this in the present instance is more correct. The forensic or narrow sense confines its meaning to the logical act of defining by genus and differentia. But this sense is proper to dialectics and disputations, not to the acts of Councils and Pontiffs. The wide and common sense is that of an authoritative termination of questions which have been in doubt and debate, and therefore of the judgment or sentence thence resulting. When the second Council of Lyons says, ' Si qu3 subortaB fuerint fidei quaestiones suo judicio debere definiri,' it means that the questions of faith ought to be ended by this judgment of the Pontiff. Definire is finem imponere, or finaliter judicare. It is therefore equivalent to determinare, or finaliter determinare, which words are those of St. Thomas when speaking of the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff. It is in this sense that the Vatican Council uses the word definienda. It signifies the final decision by which any matter of faith and morals is put into a doctrinal form.

Now it is to be observed that the definition does not speak of either controversies, or questions of faith and morals. It speaks of the doctrinal authority of the Pontiff in general; and therefore both of what may be called pacific definitions like that of the Immaculate Conception, and of controversial definitions like those of St. Innocent against the Pelagians, or St. Leo against the Monophysites. Moreover, under the term definitions, as we have seen, are included all dogmatic judgments. In the Bull Auctorem Fidei these terms are used as synonymous. The tenth proposition of the Synod of Pistoia is condemned as 'Detrahens firmitati definitionum, judiciorumve dogmaticorum EcclesiaB.' In the Italian version made by order of the Pope these words are translated, 'detraente alia fermezza delle definizioni o giudizj dommatici della Chiesa.' Now, dogmatic judgments included all judgments in matters of dogma; as for instance, the inspiration and authenticity of sacred books, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of human and uninspired books.

But intimately connected with dogma in these judgments, as we have already seen, is the grammatical and literal sense of such texts. The theological sense of such texts cannot be judged of without a discernment of their grammatical and literal sense; and both are included in the same dogmatic judgment, that is, both the dogmatic truth and the dogmatic fact.

The example above given, in which the Pontiffs approved and commended to the Church, as a rule of faith against Pelagianism, the writings of St. Augustine, was a true definition of doctrine in faith and morals. The condemnation of the 'Augustinus' of Jansenius, and of the five propositions extracted from it, was also a doctrinal definition, or a dogmatic judgment.

In like manner all censures, whether for heresy or with a note less than heresy, are doctrinal definitions in faith and morals, and are included in the words in doctrina de fide vel moribus definienda.

In a word, the whole magisterium or doctrinal authority of the Pontiff as the supreme Doctor of all Christians, is included in this definition of his infallibility. And also all legislative or judicial acts, so far as they are inseparably connected with his doctrinal authority; as, for instance, all judgments, sentences, and decisions, which contain the motives of such acts as derived from faith and morals. Under this will come laws of discipline, canonisation of Saints, approbation of religious Orders, of devotions, and the like; all of which intrinsically contain the truths and principles of faith, morals, and piety.

The Definition, then, limits the infallibility of the Pontiff to his supreme acts ex cathedra in faith and morals, but extends his infallibility to all acts in the fullest exercise of his supreme magisterium or doctrinal authority.

No better analysis can be found than that of Bellarmine, which I will therefore simply transcribe. After saying that the Pontiff may be considered in four ways 1, As a private person; 2, As a private Doctor; 3, As Pontiff alone with his counsellors; 4, As Pontiff with a General Council, Bellarmine says:

1. Both Catholics and heretics agree in two things; first, that the Pontiff, even as Pontiff and with his counsellors, or even with a General Council, may err in. controversies as to particular facts, which chiefly depend on the information and testimonies of men; secondly, that the Pontiff, as a private doctor, may err even in questions of faith and morals; and that from ignorance, as at times happens to other doctors.

2. Next, all Catholics agree in two other things, not indeed with heretics, but among themselves. First, that the Pontiff, with a General Council, cannot err in framing decrees of faith, or general precepts of morals. Secondly, that the Pontiff alone, or with his own private Council, whether he may err or not, in deciding anything in a dubious matter is, nevertheless, to be obediently listened to by all the faithful.

These points so disposed of, only four opinions remain.

4 The first is, that the Pontiff, even as Pontiff, although he define a doctrine with a General Council, may be a heretic himself, and teach heresy. . . . This is the opinion of all heretics, especially of Luther and Calvin.

i The second, that the Pontiff, even as Pontiff, may be a heretic, and may teach heresy if he define without a General Council. This is the opinion of Nilus and the later Greeks, of Gerson, Almain, and others.

4 The third, that the Pontiff cannot in any way be heretical, or publicly teach heresy, even though he alone frame a definition: which is the opinion of Pighius in book iv., chap. 3, of the " Ecclesiastical Hierarchy."

'The fourth, which lies between these extremes, is, that the Pontiff, whether personally he can be a heretic or no, cannot, in any event, define anything heretical to be believed by the whole Church. "This is the most common opinion of nearly all Catholics," as S. Thomas says.


* Of these four opinions, the first is heretical: the second not proprie heretical, for we see still that it is tolerated in the Church; yet it appears to be altogether erroneous, and proximate to heresy.

It is to be borne in mind that Bellarmine wrote this before the Four Articles of 1682 had been framed or censured.

c The third opinion is probable, but not certain.

4 The fourth opinion is most certain, and to be asserted.' *

Bellarmine in later years reviewed his 'Controversies' and wrote of this point as follows :

'This opinion is more rightly the common judgment of Catholics ; for opinion implies uncertainty, and we hold this judgment to be certain.' And again, 'I said that the opinion of those who teach that infallibility of judgment resides not in the Pope, but in the General Council, is not plainly heretical, but erroneous and proximate to heresy. We do not, indeed, venture to pronounce that opinion plainly heretical, because they who follow it have, neither they nor their books, been condemned by the Church. Nevertheless, it seems to us so manifestly erroneous, that it may deservedly be declared by the judgment of the Church to be heretical.'

* Bellarm. Controv. de Summo Pontif. lib. iv. cap. 2.

The whole Church, both the Ecclesia Docens and the Ecclesia Discens, diffused throughout the world, is infallible at all times. The Church discharges its office as witness, judge, and teacher always, and in all places. The See of Peter and the episcopate diffused throughout the world are so assisted by the perpetual presence of the Spirit of truth that they can never err as witness, judge, or teacher.

The doctrine I have maintained in these pages is as follows:

1. That the endowment of stability or infallibility in Faith was given to Peter, and from him, according to our Lord's words, confirma fratres tuos, was derived to his brethren.

2. That this endowment, which is again and again called by the Fathers and Councils the 'Privilegium Petri,' or the 'Praerogativa Sedis Petri,' was given in him to his Successors.

3. That the Successor of Peter still 'confirms his brethren' by the possession and exercise of a divine right and endowment, not only of consulting them or of convoking them, but of witnessing, teaching, and judging by a special divine assistance which preserves him, as Universal Teacher in faith and morals, from error.

The Pontiffs are witnesses, teachers, and judges of the revelation already given to the Church; and in guarding, expounding, and defending that revelation, their witness, teaching, and judgment, is by Divine assistance preserved from error.

So the extension, the scope, is identical. But the Church is infallible in her laws, for example, and I am not convinced that these can be said to fall under the rubric, "defining." I don't have the answer to this, but I think it is a real question.

So we are clear on the scope (i.e. in general). There is still the question of the various kinds of truths included, in the sense that the infallibility of canonisations, for example, was disputed by some few theologians and that was tolerated by Rome, if memory serves. Benedict XIV said that such a denial would not be heretical, but would deserve a lesser censure, but did the Church ever inflict such a censure?

Gabriele,

Yes, I agree that canonisations are infallible. Once again, we are discussing only the status of that truth.

As Fr. Ricossa points out, the reluctance to call the opposite opinion heretical arises from "respect for other schools that have a different opinion."

Benedict XIV's doctrine is published here:

http://www.strobertbellarmine.net/forum ... 46&start=0

I think that Fr. Ricossa is a little enthusiastic in his interpretation of it! "Benoît XIV (3) enseigne qu’il est certainement hérétique et téméraire de soutenir le contraire" (Benedict XIV teaches that it is certainly heretical and temerarious (rash) to argue the contrary). No, he doesn't say that, and the quote added by Fr. Ricossa shows this, so it is hard to see why he characterised it that way to begin with.

1) As you have rightly said: ” The implication of this is that in any given single act there could be error”. The consequence is that any single act of Magisterium, considered by itself, is irrelevant in order to the infallibility, that is, any single act of Magisterium is “dead”.

2) Once admitted the infallibility of the ordinary universal Magisterium, it is useless to consider the problem of the infallibility of the ordinary pontifical Magisterium, because the definition of the Vatican Council says that the Roman Pontiff possesses the same infallibility which the Church possesses (in French: le Pape jouit de la même infaillibilité que l’Eglise) (Vatican Council: “when the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, … he possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals”).

3) The ordinary universal Magisterium includes the ordinary Magisterium of the Pope and the ordinary Magisterium of all other bishop. If we say that the Magisterium of the Pope is infallible because it is united (conjoint) to the ordinary Magisterium of all other bishops we admit that the bishops confirm the Pope in the Faith. But this is an error since the Pope confirms the bishops! So we must conclude that the ordinary Magisterium of the Pope is infallible by himself, without the Magisterium of all the other bishops.

Well I am not sure the logic is sound. A teaching effort involves a series of acts each doing specific work towards producing the end - the clear grasp of the doctrine by the student. You might as well say that if a brick is not the final one, then it is not part of the building. Nobody thinks that every act of the magisterium taken in its broadest sense is infallible, but I would say that this is evidence of life, not death. Let's talk about a specific case - Unam Sanctam. The deposing power is implicitly asserted there. But it was not asserted as a divinely revealed doctrine that popes have the power to depose secular rulers by divine law. Pius IX's comment about this clarified it if there remained any doubt. Popes possessed the deposing power by virtue of what is called their indirect authority (i.e. their duty and right to judge faith and morals means that they have the right and duty of declaring whether secular laws and policies accord with divine revelation). I would summarise the point by saying that not all of Unam Sanctam is "infallible" insofar as not all of Unam Sanctam is a clear statement of what has been divinely revealed. Some of it is the application of divinely revealed truth to conditions as they then existed (i.e. the existing constitution of the civil order). What is inadmissible, certainly on Franzelin's theory, is that anything is asserted in that bull which is contrary to divine revelation, even implicitly. But the whole bull is not a "definition":- therefore the part that is a definition is an infallible assertion per se, and perhaps other assertions are also (applying Monsignor Fenton's principle), but not every word of it is infallible.

In the matter of Church-State relations, a great deal of work by theologians (including and especially St. Robert Bellarmine) was done in order to clarify the essential principles and to distinguish these from the application of those principles to concrete conditions. In this way, over the centuries, the Church's mind has become clearer, and at some point the doctrine will be ripe for definition - perhaps it is now.

What Dom Nau was addressing (ordinary pontifical Magisterium) was precisely the question of the doctrinal note to be applied to particular statements of the pope, taken in isolation or as parts of a series on the same point. For example, the assertion by Pope Pius XII that episcopal jurisdiction derives from God via the Roman Pontiff: was this single statement a "definition" and therefore infallible, or was it not a "definition" in the Vatican Council sense, and yet still an infallible assertion, or was it not a definition and therefore not infallible?

Do the specific doctrinal acts of popes - that is, the individual statements in, say, encyclicals - in themselves meet the description of "ordinary, universal teaching"? We know that the various acts of the bishops united to the pope, scattered throughout the world, taken collectively, do meet that description. Nau says no, the individual acts of the popes do not meet it. Only a series of papal acts constitute an infallible teaching effort. Fenton says that any direct assertion of a truth by the Roman Pontiff addressing the whole Church is infallible. This seems to me to be the truth of the matter. Dom Nau's principle would apply when any specific statement is not in itself sufficiently clear.

John,
I think to have understood only now what you are saying. I am sorry. Ok, we agree. Personally, I'm not very interested in the debate on the status of this or others truth.